Poor communication, understaffing, an absence of enough planning and chaotic situations contributed to the failure to situation well timed evacuation orders to elements of Altadena because the lethal Eaton hearth raced by way of the neighborhood, in line with a long-awaited report launched Thursday.
The report didn’t assign blame to people for the botched alerts however discovered Los Angeles County had no clear course of for who ought to situation evacuation orders and referred to as for vital reforms. Nineteen folks died within the hearth, all however certainly one of whom was present in west Altadena, an space that didn’t get evacuation alerts till hours after the fireplace broke out.
The 132-page report launched Thursday appeared to downplay how early the fireplace threatened west Altadena — regardless of 911 calls that reported flames and smoke within the space — and solely as soon as talked about the 19 individuals who died within the hearth.
As an alternative, it centered on the fireplace’s “good storm,” poor preparation and the truth that the satellite-outlined “hearth entrance” hadn’t entered west Altadena till 5 a.m., after evacuation alerts had been issued, although a number of spot fires had been confirmed within the space earlier within the evening.
The impartial investigation by consulting agency McChrystal Group, launched eight months after the Los Angeles space firestorm, got here after The Occasions revealed that the county didn’t situation evacuation alerts in west Altadena till hours after smoke and flames from the Eaton hearth had threatened the neighborhood.
Whereas areas east of Lake Avenue bought evacuation orders simply after 7 p.m. on Jan. 7, most of west Altadena didn’t obtain any evacuation alerts till 3:30 a.m. Some zones didn’t obtain alerts till nearly 6 a.m., hours after folks started reporting hearth within the space to 911.
Officers advised The Occasions that the accountability to situation evacuation orders was break up amongst three companies: the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Division, the Los Angeles County Fireplace Division and the county Workplace of Emergency Administration.
However Los Angeles County Sheriff Robert Luna later downplayed his division’s function, saying firefighters usually take the lead as a result of they’re “the specialists” in such conditions. The Workplace of Emergency Administration, which is answerable for sending out alerts, mentioned there have been no technical points.
With out assigning blame or explaining what went improper, the report confirmed that between 1 and three a.m. on Jan. 8, the county didn’t ship out any evacuation alerts — together with to west Altadena. The report mentioned that at the moment, “all areas [L.A. county fire officials] believed had been straight impacted by or in danger from the Eaton Fireplace had already obtained an evacuation warning or order.”
However that was not the case.
The primary evacuation order for west Altadena got here at 3:25 a.m., after dispatchers obtained not less than 14 experiences of fireside within the space, in line with 911 logs from the Los Angeles County Fireplace Division obtained by The Occasions.
The report mentioned that the preliminary requires hearth didn’t match the situation of destroyed constructions, showing to query the validity of these early calls and the presence of flames. The report claimed that the primary 911 name for a hearth in west Altadena the place the construction was later confirmed broken got here simply earlier than 1 a.m. on Jan. 8 — nonetheless greater than two hours earlier than evacuation orders had been issued.
The experiences supplies two examples of Fireplace Division workers flagging that the fireplace could also be burning west greater than an hour earlier than evacuations alerts went out for west Altadena.
A Fireplace Division workers member within the subject in Altadena mentioned they prompt to Unified Command workers just a little earlier than midnight on Jan. 8 that, as a consequence of excessive winds, evacuation orders ought to exit for the foothills of Altadena, all the way in which to La Cañada. Unified Command workers mentioned they didn’t recall this occurring and that the fireplace entrance was not transferring west on the time.
About two hours later, at 2:18 a.m., a staffer with the county Fireplace Division radioed in that they noticed hearth north of Farnsworth Park transferring west alongside the foothills.
Although some officers current within the decision-making course of advised investigators they’d taken notes within the subject about evacuation choices, the notes “had been both incomplete, not time-stamped, or not maintained.”
The report mentioned: “No official type or documentation was utilized by LACoFD, LASD or OEM to collectively and formally document which zones ought to obtain evacuation orders or warnings, the time the choice was made, or the time the zones had been communicated to OEM workers on the EOC.”
The report additionally talked about — with out naming particular folks or companies — that the county “had issues about over-warning” in the course of the hearth, worrying about including confusion, panic or pointless visitors points. State pointers on alert and warning programs explicitly warn in opposition to this, as have specialists, repeatedly.
The report mentioned that based mostly on satellite tv for pc knowledge from the Nationwide Guard, the fireplace entrance didn’t cross into western Altadena till round 5 a.m., two hours after evacuation orders had been issued. The report acknowledged that 911 calls had been coming in from the realm hours earlier than the orders, however categorized these incidents as “spot fires.”
The report repeatedly mentions how situations created a “good storm” for firefighters, whereas highlighting that there appeared to be an actual focus about NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab in La Cañada Flintridge catching hearth, which may launch poisonous fumes if ignited.
Whereas the fireplace initially burned eastward, firefighters quickly reported that it was spreading “all over the place ” with wind gusts of 70 to 90 mph.
“Evacuation choices and messages couldn’t hold tempo with the fireplace,” the report acknowledged.
The report additionally claims that the fireplace entered west Altadena as wind speeds elevated, describing it as a “extra densely populated” space with older properties constructed with supplies that had been “extra weak to ignition.”
The report discovered a number of issues with how the county carries out evacuations.
Generally, when officers evacuated a zone, they’d robotically evacuate the zone subsequent to it. However that observe was not codified and didn’t occur in western Altadena.
The report additionally identified that, for the inhabitants it serves, the county’s Workplace of Emergency Administration was significantly smaller than such companies serving even smaller jurisdictions. “In comparison with OEMs in jurisdiction of comparable dimension (though not as giant or complicated), the Los Angeles County’s OEM has considerably much less workers, finances and autonomy over its working capabilities,” the report discovered.
The three companies in cost additionally didn’t have a single platform with which to coordinate communication, exacerbating points with decision-making throughout the fireplace response, the report discovered. Sheriff’s Division workers might not have been conscious in actual time of which zones had been underneath evacuation warnings or orders, as they weren’t at all times aspect by aspect with different companies at Unified Command, in line with the report.
The report was performed by the McChrystal Group, a consulting agency with expertise assessing authorities response to pure disasters. The report included dozens of interviews with hearth and county officers in addition to public listening periods.
Throughout a Could 7 listening session, residents repeatedly advised the consultants that their evacuation orders had been dangerously delayed. “None of us actually obtained alerts,” mentioned one lady.
In 2019, nearly a 12 months after the Woolsey hearth, an analogous report ready by Citygate Associates detailed how a number of simultaneous fires strained first responders’ capability to prioritize the place to ship folks. The blaze destroyed some 1,600 constructions and killed three folks.
Comparable points had been discovered with the county’s response this January, in line with the 2025 report. Each experiences questioned the knowledge of additional improvement in fire-prone areas, given officers’ acknowledged incapability to defend the huge variety of Californians who dwell inside high-risk areas.
A Occasions investigation additionally discovered that almost all county hearth vehicles didn’t shift into west Altadena till lengthy after it was ravaged by hearth. Many county hearth vehicles had already been deployed to the Palisades hearth and to east Altadena. Los Angeles County Fireplace Chief Anthony C. Marrone mentioned the dearth of fireside vehicles in west Altadena most likely boiled all the way down to “human error” by hearth officers who determined the place the vehicles ought to transfer.
